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Asymmetric Leakage from Multiplier
and Collision-Based Single-Shot Side-Channel Attack
Takeshi SUGAWARAya), Daisuke SUZUKIy,Members, andMinoru SAEKIyy, Nonmember
SUMMARY The single-shot collision attack on RSA proposed by Han-
ley et al. is studied focusing on the dierence between two operands of
multiplier. It is shown that how leakage from integer multiplier and long-
integer multiplication algorithm can be asymmetric between two operands.
The asymmetric leakage is verified with experiments on FPGA and micro-
controller platforms. Moreover, we show an experimental result in which
success and failure of the attack is determined by the order of operands.
Therefore, designing operand order can be a cost-eective countermeasure.
Meanwhile we also show a case in which a particular countermeasure be-
comes ineective when the asymmetric leakage is considered. In addition
to the above main contribution, an extension of the attack by Hanley et al.
using the signal-processing technique of Big Mac Attack is presented.
key words: RSA, side-channel attack, collision attack, Montgomery multi-
plication
1. Introduction
Side-channel attack (SCA) is one of the main research sub-
jects in cryptography implementation. The attack exploits
side-channel information, such as power dissipation and
electromagnetic radiation, caused as a side-eect of cryp-
tographic operation. With the help of side-channel infor-
mation, attacker may successfully analyze cryptography [2].
The first attacks known as simple power analysis (SPA) and
dierential power analysis (DPA) were presented by Kocher
et al. in 1999 [3]. Since then, new attack and countermea-
sure have been studied so far.
Kocher et al. presented the first SCA against RSA [3].
The basic concept of the attack is to directly decode a se-
cret exponent by distinguishing multiplication from squar-
ing in a common modular exponentiation algorithm. That
is a single-shot attack. In other words, a trace of single
RSA execution is sucient to attack the cryptography. The
single-shot attack is feasible only when the dierence be-
tween multiplication and squaring are easily observable e.g.,
there is a data-dependent conditional branch. In order to
counteract the attack, branch-less algorithms are developed.
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The well-known multiply-always method in Alg. 1 falls in
this category.
Even after data-dependent branch is removed, there is
residual side-channel leakage correlated to the operands of
the multiplication and squaring [4]. The residual leakage is
small [5], but further research has been conducted in order
to exploit it. Using multiple traces is one direction of re-
search, however, there are ecient countermeasures against
multiple-shot attacks [6]. Therefore, improving single-shot
attack has become an important challenge. As a result of
improvements in measurement and signal processing, suc-
cessful single-shot attacks on FPGA implementations were
recently reported [7]–[9]. That means the residual leakage
should be suppressed for secure implementation.
Consequently, suppressing the residual leakage has be-
come a new challenge. Hanley et al. suggested to use
multiplier-level countermeasure [10]–[12] and that seems
to be a promising approach. For leakage suppression, deep
understanding of leakage from multiplier is needed. Since
multiplier is a core component in RSA implementation, it
has been extensively studied from arithmetic-circuit to ar-
chitectural levels. In contrast, there are quite few conven-
tional studies on the way how multiplier makes side-channel
leakage [10], [13], [14].
In this paper, leakage from multiplier is studied focus-
ing on dierence between two operands. It is shown that
how leakage from integer multiplier and long-integer multi-
plication algorithm can be asymmetric between operands.
The asymmetric leakage is verified with experiments on
FPGA and micro-controller platforms. Moreover, the ex-
perimental results show that the order of operands signif-
icantly aect the success rate of a single-shot attack. Its
consequence is two folds: (i) designing operand order can
be a cost-eective countermeasure, while (ii) some counter-
measures become ineective when the asymmetric leakage
is considered.
A1 It is shown that how leakage from integer multiplier
and long-integer multiplication algorithm can be asymmet-
ric between two operands.
A2 The asymmetric leakage is verified in FPGA and
micro-controller platforms. In the experiment, it is also
shown that the order of operands significantly aect the suc-
cess rate of a single-shot attack.
A3 It is shown that designing the order of operands can be
a cost-eective countermeasure.
A4 It is shown that a specific countermeasure becomes
Copyright c 2016 The Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers
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ineective when the asymmetric leakage is considered.
In addition to the above main results, there are two ad-
ditional contributions.
B1 The single-shot attack by Hanley et al. [9] is extended
using the technique of Big Mac Attack [13].
B2 The first experimental result of successfully analyz-
ing an FPGA implementation of RSA with the multiply-
always method using single-shot internal-collision attack is
presented.
The paper is organized as follows. Its correspondence
to the contributions A1-A4 and B1-B2 is also described. In
Sect. 2, the related studies are reviewed followed by the pro-
posed extension of the attack by Hanley et al. (B1). In
Sect. 3, the way how leakage from integer multiplier and
long-integer multiplication algorithm can be asymmetric is
discussed (A1). Then, the asymmetric leakage is verified
with experiments in Sect. 4 (A1). In the section, the attack
in Sect. 2 is applied to an FPGA implementation with vari-
ous operand orders (B2). The experimental results are dis-
cussed in Sect. 5. It is shown that the asymmetry can be
used as a cost-eective countermeasure (A3) meanwhile it
can cause a problem in a certain countermeasure (A4). It
is also shown that the asymmetric leakage is measurable in
a microcontroller and thus the results in this paper are also
relevant to software implementation of cryptography (A2).
Sect. 6 is a concluding remark.
2. Single-Shot Collision Attack
Conventional attacks are briefly reviewed. Then, the two
most relevant attacks namely (i) the multiple-shot attack by
Witteman et al. [15] and (ii) the single-shot attack by Han-
ley et al. [9] are described in detail. Finally, the proposed
extension of the attack by Hanley et al. is described.
2.1 Conventional Single-Shot Attacks
Simple Power Analysis (SPA) [3] As described in the
introduction, Kocher et al. proposed the first single-shot at-
tack on RSA. The attack exploits binary method used for
modular exponentiation. In binary method, there is a condi-
tional branch between multiplication and squaring depend-
ing a secret bit. The idea of the attack is to directly decode a
secret exponent by distinguishing multiplication from squar-
ing by inspecting a side-channel trace.
Big Mac Attack (BMA) [13] Walter proposed BMA
to attack another modular exponentiation algorithm called
the window method [13]. In the attack, two distinct parts of
a trace are compared to find collision. Information of pres-
ence (or equivalently absence) of collision can be used to
attack cryptography. Along with the attack, a sophisticated
signal-processing technique is introduced in order to e-
ciently find the collision. Firstly, a segment to be compared
is split into multiple sub-segments. Then the sub-segments
Algorithm 1 Multiply-Always Method with Left-To-Right
Scanning
Input: Message M, Modulo N, Secret exponent d = (dt 1;    ; d0)2
Output: Ciphertext Md
1: R0  1
2: for j = t   1 downto 0 do
3: d j  1   d j
4: R0  R20 mod N
5: Rd j  R0  M mod N
6: end for
7: Return R0
are averaged together and an averaged segment is obtained.
Finally, two averaged segments are compared to detect col-
lision. Since signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the averaged
segments are higher because of the averaging, collision is
eciently detected. Feasibility of the attack is proved with
simulation [13]. However, no practical result has been re-
ported as described by Clavier et al. [16].
Horizontal Correlation Power Analysis (HCPA) [10]
HCPA proposed by Clavier et al. is a successor of BMA
[10]. In the attack, a single trace is split into many sub-
traces in the same manner as BMA. Then, a multiple-shot
attack is mounted to the virtual multiple traces. There are
experimental results successfully attacking software imple-
mentations [10].
Clustering-based attack [7] Heyszl et al. proposed an
attack using the k-means clustering algorithm [7]. In the at-
tack, traces are classified into two clusters that supposedly
correspond to the value of a secret bit. In addition, high-
quality electromagnetic traces are measured and used for the
analysis. The attack is then improved by Perin et al. [8]. As
a result of the improvements both in distinguisher and mea-
surement, successful attack on FPGA platform is reported
[7], [8]. Notably, Perin et al. succeeded in attacking an
FPGA implementation with a multiplier-level countermea-
sure called the leak resilient arithmetic [12] by exploiting
the remaining first-order leakage.
2.2 Multiple-Shot Internal-Collision Attack by Witteman
et al. [15]
Witteman et al. proposed a new multiple-shot attack which
exploits collision between consecutive operations i.e., inter-
nal collision [15]. The attack on the multiply-always method
(Alg. 1) is described.
The consecutive multiplication and squaring in Alg. 1
are considered. For clarity they are rewritten as
R0
d j
 R0  M mod N; (1)
R000  R020 mod N: (2)
If d j = 1, the memory R0 is not updated in Eq. (1) and
thus R0 = R00. Therefore, the consecutive multiplication and
squaring have the same input i.e., there is collision. Alter-
natively when d j = 0, R0 , R00 and there is no collision.
As a result, a secret bit is revealed every single time pres-
ence/absence of collision is observed.
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The collision is detected using correlation-coecient
matrix. Suppose L dierent messages are encrypted with the
same exponent. Traces for multiplication and squaring for
the i-th message are denoted bymit and s
i
t, respectively. Note
that the subscript t is time index. The correlation coecient
matrix Cx;y is calculated as follows:
Cx;y = F j[m jx; s jy]: (3)
Here, F j is the correlation-coecient operator defined by
F j[m j; s j] := 1L
L 1X
j=0
(m j   E j[m j])  (s j   E j[s j])pV j[m j]  V j[s j] ; (4)
E j[m j] := 1L
L 1X
j=0
m j (5)
V j[m j] := E j[(m j)2]   E j[m j]2: (6)
If there is a collision, Cx;y contains a non-zero value.
Therefore, the collision can be found by inspecting the ma-
trix.
2.3 Single-Shot Internal-Collision Attacks by Hanley et al.
[9]
Hanley et al. proposed a single-shot attack against various
addition-chain algorithms. The attack uses internal collision
similarly to the one by Witteman et al. but it uses only a sin-
gle trace. That enables the new attack to defeat the blinding
countermeasure [6]. In the following description, the attack
for the multiply-always method is described.
The attack by Witteman et al. cannot be used for the
single-shot setting because Eq. (4) is useless for L = 1y.
Instead, Hanley et al. proposed to compare the traces m0x
and s0x in time domain. Two dierent ways are proposed
for measuring the similarity: the Euclidean distance and the
time-domain correlation coecient given by Fx[m0x; s0x].
Hanley et al. applied the attack to a software implemen-
tation and successfully recovered 99% of the exponent bits.
They also applied the attack to an FPGA implementation,
however, the attempt was unsuccessful for the multiply-
always method. The result can be reasoned by lower SNR in
side-channel information from FPGA. SNR has a big impact
on the success rate of single-shot attack.
The attack uses multiple points of interest. That is the
advantage of the attack over the clustering-based attacks [8].
Therefore, the multiply-always method can be defeated even
if there is no first-order leakage [8]. In addition, the attack
is advantageous to HCPA on the point that is feasible with
unknown message. In other words, the attack by Hanley et
al. defeats the message-blinding countermeasure [6].
2.4 Proposed Extension of the Attack by Hanley et al.
An extension of the attack by Hanley et al. is described. The
yNote that Clavier et al. proposed another single-shot extension
[16] which aim at distinguishing multiplication from squaring.
idea is to use the technique from BMA as a preprocessing
thereby improve SNR yy.
Multiplication and squaring found in modular expo-
nentiation algorithm is realized by long-integer multiplica-
tion. Hereafter, long-integer multiplication A  B is con-
sidered. A and B are composed of s words and denoted
by A = fas 1;    ; a0g and B = fbs 1;    ; b0g where a j
and bi are words. The long-integer multiplication comprises
partial-product generation namely a j  bi. The leakage of
a j  bi is denoted by l( j; i).
The trace l( j; i) is pre-processed as shown in Fig. 1.
l( j; i) is compressed into two s-dimensional vectors la( j) and
lb(i) defined by
la( j) =
1
s
s 1X
i=0
l( j; i); (7)
lb(i) =
1
s
s 1X
j=0
l( j; i): (8)
la( j) and lb(i) are called the compressed vectors. By the
compression, the eect of one operand is removed thereby
improving SNR of another. The compressed vectors la( j)
and lb(i) correlate to a j and bi, respectively. This is the same
approach as BMA.
Finally, the compressed vectors from multiplication
and squaring traces are compared in the same manner as
the original attack by Hanley et al. The measured traces of
multiplication and squaring are denoted by l( j; i) and l0( j; i),
respectively. The corresponding compressed vectors are de-
noted by la( j), l0a( j), lb(i), and l0b(i). The compressed vectors
are compared with correlation coecient as follows:
F j[la( j); l0a( j)] 2 [ 1; 1]; (9)
Fi[lb(i); l0b(i)] 2 [ 1; 1]: (10)
Either Eqs. (9) or (10) is used depending on which operand
has collision.
In order to conduct the attack, the attacker should know
the positions of l( j; i) in a raw trace. That is the same pre-
requisite as BMA and HCPA. Even if the prior knowledge
is unavailable, the attacker can possibly reverse-engineer the
points of l( j; i) by analyzing the correlation matrix in Eq. (3).
That is because patterns found in the matrix reflect the un-
derlying long-integer multiplication algorithm. That is ex-
plained in Sect. 4.2 with experimental results. Note that in
order to get a meaningful correlation matrix, the exponent
blinding should be disabled. There are some realistic sit-
uations in which the condition is satisfied. Firstly, the at-
tacker with an open sample can possibly profile the device
while disabling the countermeasure. Secondly, the same
co-processor for modular exponentiation may be used for
another purpose without the exponent blinding. One such
example is signature verification in which no secret is in-
volved.
yyThe method can be thought as a missing variant with “regular
algorithm + unknown message” in the categorization by Bauer et
al. [11].
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Fig. 1 The distinguisher based on Big Mac Attack.
3. Asymmetric Leakage
Dierence between two operands of multiplier is discussed
in (i) integer multiplier and (ii) long-integer multiplication
(LIM) levels.
3.1 Asymmetry at Integer Multiplier Level
In the paper of BMA, Walter showed that two operands of
a simple integer multiplier are symmetric in terms of side-
channel leakage [13]. However, sophisticated multipliers
can be asymmetric as described below.
The Booth recoding is a common technique for partial
product generation y [17]. The technique enables to reduce
the total number of partial products thereby improving per-
formance. Figure 2 shows a circuit for generating one partial
product using the radix-4 Booth recoding. The word length
is denoted by w. Firstly, the multiplicand A is expanded to
f2A; A, 0, A, 2Ag. The expansion is eciently implemented
using arithmetic shift and NOT gates. Then, one out of five
candidates is selected at the 5:1 selector. The selector output
is the partial product. The selector is controlled by a 3-bit
chunk of the multiplier namely fxi+1; xi; xi 1g.
The circuit in Fig. 2 has asymmetry in terms of
operands. Leakage from a 32-bit integer multiplier with the
radix-4 Booth recoding is investigated with simulation. The
multiplier is synthesized and post-synthesis logic simulation
is conducted. During the simulation, the number of signal-
transition events i.e., toggles is counted and recorded.
Two testvectors namely A and B are examined. Firstly,
32-bit integers c and hi are generated for 0  i < 10; 000. In
the testvector A, c  hi is calculated. In this case, the circuit
is driven with fixed multiplier and variable multiplicand. In
the testvector B, hi  c is calculated wherein the circuit is
driven with variable multiplier and fixed multiplicand.
Histograms of the measured toggle counts are shown
yNote that Walter and Samyde noticed that leakage from the
Booth recoding does not obey by the Hamming-weight model [14].
However, the dierence between operands was not mentioned.
Fig. 2 Partial-product generator for the radix-4 Booth recoding.
Fig. 3 Toggle counts of a 32-bit multiplier.
in Fig. 3. The black and white bars correspond to the result
by two sets of test-vectors. The result shows that histograms
distribute dierently depending on the test-vector. As shown
in the histograms, more toggles are observed when the mul-
tiplicand is fixed. In other words, the number of signal-
transition events is more susceptible to the multiplier port
compared the multiplicand port. The result is explained
by an empirical fact that a selector signal has stronger ef-
fect on toggle counts. In Fig. 2, the 3-bit selector signal
fxi+1; xi; xi 1g drives the w-bit data path. Therefore, changes
in the 3-bit signal are amplified to w bits.
3.2 Asymmetry at Long-Integer Multiplication Level
Dierence of operands at the LIM level is discussed. The
Montgomery multiplication [18] with the coarsely inte-
grated operand scanning (CIOS) [19] shown in Alg. 2 is
SUGAWARA et al.: ASYMMETRIC LEAKAGE FROMMULTIPLIER AND COLLISION-BASED SINGLE-SHOT SIDE-CHANNEL ATTACK
1327
Algorithm 2 Coarsely Integrated Operand Scanning [19]
Input: Word A = fas 1;    ; a0g and B = fbs 1;    ; b0g
Output: Product ti for i 2 [0; s   1]
1: for i = 0 to s   1 do
2: C  0
3: for j = 0 to s   1 do
4: (C; S ) t j + a j  bi +C
5: t j  S
6: end for
7: (C; S ) ts +C
8: ts  S
9: ts+1  C
10: C  0
11: m t0  n00 mod W
12: for j = 0 to s   1 do
13: (C; S ) t j + m  n j +C
14: t j  S
15: end for
16: (C; S ) ts +C
17: ts  S
18: ts+1  ts+1 +C
19: for j = 0 to s do
20: t j  t j+1
21: end for
22: end for
23: Return t j
considered. Inputs are expressed as A = fas 1;    ; a0g and
B = fbs 1;    ; b0g where a j and bi are words. The core
operation is partial-product generation a j  bi at the line
4 of Alg. 2. Fig. 4 shows a common circuit architecture
for LIM using a w-bit multiply-and-accumulate (MAC) unit
[20]. The MAC unit operates (x; y; z) 7! z+ x  y where z is
usually an accumulator. The words a j and bi are read from
the memory and fed to the MAC unit via w-bit temporal reg-
isters labelled regA and regB.
Suppose regA and regB store the long integers A and
B, respectively. Figure 4 also shows an operation sequence
describing the contents of the registers. As shown in the ta-
ble, regB is updated less frequently because bi is scanned at
the outer loop in Alg. 2. For s-word long-integer multipli-
cation, regA and regB are updated s2 and s times, respec-
tively.
In CMOS, a strong dynamic current is caused when
input is changed [2]. As a result, the operand scanned at
the inner loop (i.e., A) has stronger leakage. This LIM-level
asymmetry is verified through experiments in Sect. 4.
4. Experiments
The attack described in Sect. 2.4 is applied to an FPGA im-
plementation of the Montgomery multiplication. The ex-
periment is conducted for all the possible operand orders in
order to investigate how asymmetric leakage aect success
rate of the attack.
4.1 Setup
A circuit implementing the 1024-bit Montgomery multipli-
cation is examined. The circuit uses the MAC-based archi-
Fig. 4 Common circuit architecture for long-integer multiplication using
an multiply-and-accumulate unit.
Fig. 5 A de-packaged FPGA chip for measurement.
tecture in Fig. 4. The MAC unit has a 64-bit integer multi-
plier and thus the number of words s = 16 = 1024=64. The
words are scanned with the CIOS method in Alg. 2. The
MAC unit has a special 1-bit input with which operands to
the integer multiplier is swapped. The signal is used in order
to evaluate the asymmetry at the integer-multiplier level.
The design of the 1024-bit Montgomery multiplication
is implemented on Virtex-II Pro FPGA on SASEBO [21].
For preparation, the chip is de-packaged as shown in Fig. 5.
Then, traces are measured by putting a magnetic-field probe
on the die surface [22]. The probe is 0.1 mm in diameter.
Traces are captured using an oscilloscope with the band-
width of 12.5 GHz and the sampling rate of 25.0 GSa/s.
Test-vectors are designed to emulate RSA with the
multiply-always method (see Alg. 1). Firstly, 1024-bit ran-
dom numbers uk, vk, and wk are generated for k 2 [0; 999].
For each triplet (uk; vk; wk), the Montgomery multiplica-
tion denoted by M(; ) is called in five ways: M(uk; vk),
M(uk; vk) with its integer operand swapped, M(uk; uk),
M(vk; vk), andM(wk; wk). The five Montgomery multiplica-
tions are called with identifiers namely (UV), (UV), (UU),
(VV), and (WW). (UV) and (UV) are dierent in the or-
der of operands to the 64-bit integer multiplier. That is re-
alized by the afore-mentioned special feature of the MAC
unit. Table 1 also summarizes the correspondence between
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Table 1 Test-vectors of the Montgomery multiplication.
Correspondence between (uk ; vk ; wk) and multiplier operand
LIM level integer-multiplier level
Identifier Operation Trace Inner loop (a j in Alg. 2) Outer loop (bi in Alg. 2) multiplier multiplicand
(UV) M(uk; vk) Tuv(k; t) uk vk vk uk
(UV) M(uk; vk) Tuv(k; t) uk vk uk vk
(UU) M(uk ; uk) Tuu(k; t) uk uk uk uk
(VV) M(vk ; vk) Tvv(k; t) vk vk vk vk
(WW) M(wk ; wk) Tww(k; t) wk wk wk wk
Table 2 Examined pairs of traces.
Traces Colliding operand
Identifier Multiplication Squaring LIM-level integer-multiplier-level
(UV;UU) Tuv(k; t) Tuu(k; t) Inner loop (a j in Alg. 2) multiplicand
(UV;VV) Tuv(k; t) Tvv(k; t) Outer loop (bi in Alg. 2) multiplier
(UV ;UU) Tuv(k; t) Tuu(k; t) Inner loop (a j in Alg. 2) multiplier
(UV ;VV) Tuv(k; t) Tvv(k; t) Outer loop (bi in Alg. 2) multiplicand
(UV;WW) Tuv(k; t) Tww(k; t) — —
(UV ;WW) Tuv(k; t) Tww(k; t) — —
(uk; vk; wk) and the operands in the integer-multiplier and
LIM levels. The measured side-channel traces for the k-th
triplet are denoted by Tuv(k; t), Tuv(k; t), Tuu(k; t), Tvv(k; t),
and Tww(k; t) where t is time index.
The traces are examined in pair. Six pairs namely
f(UV); (UV)g  f(UU); (VV); (WW)g:
are evaluated as summarized in Table 2. The pair corre-
sponds to consecutive multiplication and squaring in the
multiply-always method: (UV), (UV) correspond to mul-
tiplication while (UU), (VV), and (WW) are squaring. The
pairs are referred by identifiers namely (UV;UU), (UV;VV),
(UV ;UU), (UV ;VV), (UV;WW), and (UV ;WW).
Table 2 also summarizes colliding operand both at
the integer-multiplier and LIM levels. In (UV;UU) and
(UV ;UU), the operand scanned at the inner loop of Alg. 2
has collision at the LIM-level. On the other hand, the
operand scanned at the outer loop has collision in (UV;VV)
and (UV ;VV). At the integer-multiplier level, multiplicand
collides in (UV;UU) and (UV ;VV). Meanwhile multiplier
collides in (UV;VV) and (UV ;UU). There is no collision in
(UV;WW) and (UV ;WW).
The pairs are compared under the multiple- and single-
shot attacks in the following sections.
4.2 Application of the Multiple-Shot Attack by Witte-
man et al.
As a preliminary experiment, the pairs of the traces are an-
alyzed using the attack by Witteman et al. For the pairs
(UV;UU), (UV;VV), (UV ;UU), and (UV ;VV), correlation
matrices are obtained as follows:
C(UV;UU)x;y = Fk[Tuv(k; x);Tuu(k; y)]; (11)
C(UV;VV)x;y = Fk[Tuv(k; x);Tvv(k; y)]; (12)
C(UV ;UU)x;y = Fk[Tuv(k; x);Tuu(k; y)]; (13)
C(UV ;VV)x;y = Fk[Tvv(k; x); Tvv(k; y)]; (14)
where Fk[; ] is the correlation-coecient operator in
Eq. (4).
The matrices are shown as bitmap images in Fig. 6. The
bitmap images show dierent patterns depending on the col-
liding operands at the LIM level. There are repeated slash
lines on Fig. 6-(i) and -(iii) in which there are collisions at
the inner loop. On the other hand, collision at the outer loop
makes rectangle patterns as shown in Fig. 6-(ii).
The bitmap images also show the dierence caused by
the asymmetry at the integer-multiplier level. The multi-
plier (cf. the multiplicand) shows higher correlation as ex-
pected in Sect. 3.1. The slash lines are brighter in Fig 6-(iii)
compared to the ones in Fig. 6-(i). Similarly, the rectangle
patterns are more distinct in Fig. 6-(ii). Quantitative com-
parison is conducted in the next section.
In Sect. 2.4, the way how to find points of interest
namely l( j; i) is discussed. The discussion is revisited con-
sidering the experimental result. In Fig. 6, a bright pixel
corresponds to integer multiplications with collision. There-
fore, their time indices can be used as the points of interest.
Figure 7 shows how the slash lines in Fig. 6 is sampled as
points of interest (for the number of words s = 4).
4.3 Application of the Proposed Single-Shot Attack
The proposed attack described in Sect. 2.4 is applied to the
traces. That is applied to all the six pairs in Table 2. Con-
sidering colliding operands, Eq. (9) is used for (UV;UU)
and (UV ;UU) while Eq. (10) is used for (UV;VV) and
(UV ;VV).
Correlation coecients are obtained by applying the
attack to the pairs. Since there are 1; 000 traces, 1; 000 cor-
relation coecients are obtained for each pair. They are
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Fig. 6 Correlation-coecient matrices C(UV;UU)x;y , C
(UV;VV)
x;y , C
(UV ;UU)
x;y , and C
(UV ;VV)
x;y shown as bitmap
images. (i)-(iv) correspond to dierent operand orders.
Fig. 7 Determining points of interest from correlation matrix.
shown as histograms in Fig. 8. Figure 8-(i) to -(iv) cor-
respond to the pairs (UV;UU), (UV;VV), (UV ;UU) and
(UV ;VV), respectively. The no-collision pairs (UV;WW)
and (UV ;WW) are also shown in each sub-figure for com-
parison. In each sub-figure, black and white bars represent
correlation coecients in cases with and without collision.
The figure shows that correlation coecients distribute sep-
arably in some pairs.
Distinguishability between distributions with and with-
out collision is evaluated. The black and white bars in Fig. 8
are composed of 1; 000 samples each. A mix of them com-
prising 2; 000 samples is considered. The performance is
evaluated by classifying the mix without using prior knowl-
edge.
In this experiment, the following simple classification
is used. Firstly, the 2; 000 samples are sorted. Then, 1; 000
samples with highest correlation coecients are decided to
have collision. The remaining 1; 000 samples are decided to
have no collision. The above classification is made consid-
ering the following attack on RSA. Suppose the RSA uses
t-bit exponent. By applying the proposed attack, t corre-
lation coecients are obtained. The exponent is expected
to have t=2-bit zeros and t=2-bit ones. Therefore, the at-
tacker divides the correlation coecients into upper and
lower halves.
As a result of the thresholding, the success rates are
98.3%, 93.0%, 99.5%, and 52.7% in Fig. 8-(i) to -(iv), re-
spectively. More than 99% is achieved with (UV ;UU). That
is the first successful single-shot internal-collision attack of
the multiply-always method on FPGA. In contrast, the at-
tack is unsuccessful in (UV ;VV). The result clearly shows
that operand order has a significant impact on the success
rate of the attack.
5. Discussion
The experimental results show that the operand order has
significant impact on side-channel leakage. In this section,
consequences of the results are discussed from three dier-
ent perspectives. Firstly from circuit designer’s perspective,
leakage can be eciently reduced by appropriately design-
ing the order of operands. Secondly from attacker’s perspec-
tive, the asymmetry can be exploited as a new type of infor-
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Fig. 8 Histograms of correlation coecients for the single-shot attack. Sub-figures (i)-(iv) correspond
to dierent operand orders.
mation leakage to attack a countermeasure. Finally from
software engineer’s perspective, it is shown that the asym-
metry is measurable from microcontroller and thus it is also
relevant to software implementation of cryptography.
5.1 Leakage Reduction by Designing Operand Order
The experimental results show that operand order can di-
vide success and failure of the attack. That means that
leakage can be reduced by appropriately designing the or-
der of operands. In the previous experiment, The pair
(UV ;VV) is the best option in terms of leakage suppres-
sion (see Fig. 8-(iv)). The operand order can be changed
at almost no cost. In addition to the cost eectiveness, the
proposed method can easily be combined with other conven-
tional countermeasures (e.g., the randomized operand scan-
ning [10], [11]).
Although a specific design using the Montgomery mul-
tiplication with CIOS is discussed in this paper, the same
idea can be easily extended to many other methods. That is
because the causes of asymmetry, the partial-product gen-
eration and operand scanning, are common in long-integer
multiplication. On the other hand, an exceptional case is
worth noting. The Finely Integrated Operand Scanning
(FIOS) [19] falls in such a case. In FIOS, the register con-
taining the variable scanned at the outer cannot be kept while
the outer loop. That is because another word-wise multipli-
cation, needed for the Montgomery reduction, should be in-
terleaved. As a result, the leakage from the operand scanned
at outer loop is not necessarily smaller.
It is also worth mentioning that toggle simulation can
be used to determine a good operand order. As shown in
Sect. 3.1, the asymmetry at the integer-multiplier level can
be simulated. The LIM-level asymmetry is not simulated in
the paper, however, the frequency of register update can be
covered by the toggle simulation.
5.2 Attack on Montgomery Powering Ladder
In contrast to the previous result, the asymmetric leakage
can make some countermeasures ineective. Algorithm 3
shows the Montgomery powering ladder (MPL) [23]. We
focus on collisions between inputsy.
In MPL, consecutive operations always collides as fol-
low:
Ra  R0  R1 mod N; (15)
Ra  Ra  Ra mod N: (16)
Therefore, the presence of collision does not leak k j. How-
ever, the colliding operand depends on k j. There is collision
at the first and second operand when k j = 0 and k j = 1,
respectively. Therefore, attacker can recover a secret bit by
distinguishing the collisions in dierent operands.
Interestingly, the attack is no longer eective when
Eq. (15) and Eq. (16) are replaced with the following state-
ments found in [9].
yHanley et al. considered more general cases considering a col-
lision between input and output. However, the input-output colli-
sion was very weak in our setup.
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Algorithm 3Montgomery Powering Ladder [23]
Input: Message M, scalar k = (kt 1;    ; k0)2
Output: Ciphertext Md
1: R0  1; R1  M
2: for j = t   1 downto 0 do
3: a k j; a 1   a
4: Ra  R0  R1 mod N
5: Ra  Ra  Ra mod N
6: end for
7: Return R0
Fig. 9 Assembly code loaded on ARM Cortex-M0 core.
Table 3 Test vector to muls instruction.
Trace name Operands to muls
T(k; t) k  k
T(k; t) k  k
T(k; t) k  k
T(k; t) k  k
Ra  Ra  Ra mod N; (17)
Ra  Ra  Ra mod N: (18)
Now, collision unconditionally occurs at the first operand.
Therefore, collision becomes independent of k j. This is an-
other example showing the importance of designing operand
order.
5.3 Asymmetric Leakage in Software Implementation
So far, asymmetric leakage is discussed for hardware im-
plementation. It would be natural to ask if it is relevant to
software implementation. Since the Booth recoding is com-
monly used in commercial logic synthesizers [24], integer
multiplier on processor likely has asymmetric leakage. That
is investigated with experiment.
NXP LPC1114 [25] with ARM Cortex-M0 [26] core is
chosen as a target chip. That chip is selected because ARM
Cortex-M series is frequently used as an evaluation platform
for software implementation of cryptography [27].
Figure 9 shows a small program used for the experi-
ment. The registers r0 and r1 are initialized with input val-
ues to the multiplier before entering to the program. Then,
the multiplication instruction muls is called with r0 and
r1. The target instruction is surrounded by nop instructions
in order to reduce perturbation by neighboring instructions
processed simultaneously in a pipeline.
While executing the program in Fig. 9, side-channel
trace is measured. The LPC1114 chip is de-packaged in the
same manner as the FPGA shown in Fig. 5. Then, the chip
is measured by putting the magnetic-field probe on the die
surface.
Input to the instruction is designed similarly to
Sect. 4.3. 16-bit random integers k, k, and k are gener-
ated. For each triplet (k; k; k), four multiplications are ex-
ecuted as summarized in Table 3. The four cases are: kk,
k  k, k  k, and k  k. The measured traces for the
k-th triplet are denoted by T(k; t), T(k; t), T(k; t), and
T(k; t) wherein t is time index. Note that k, k, and k
are limited to 16 bits in order to avoid overflow in the 32-bit
multiplier.
The traces are analyzed using the approach by Witte-
man et al. Correlation-coecient matrices are evaluated for
the following three combinations:
C(;)x;y = Fk[T(k; x);T(k; y)]; (19)
C(;)x;y = Fk[T(k; x);T(k; y)]; (20)
C(;)x;y = Fk[T(k; x);T(k; y)]: (21)
The notation follows Eq. (4). C(;)x;y and C
(;)
x;y have col-
lision in dierent operand. Meanwhile C(;)x;y has no colli-
sion.
Bitmap images of matrices C(;)x;y , C
(;)
x;y , and
C(;)x;y are shown in Fig. 10 (1), (2), and (3), respectively.
The figures involve a single clock cycle in which muls is
executed.
The time when the correlation coecients are maxi-
mized is indicated by dashed lines. For clarity, cross-section
of the matrices at the dash lines are shown in Fig. 10 (1’),
(2’), and (3’). There are spikes in C(;)x;y and C
(;)
x;y as
expected. There is dierence in the strengths of the cor-
relation coecients. The peak of correlation coecient in
C(;)x;y is around 0:2 while that is about 0:8 in C
(;)
x;y . The
result clearly shows that the second operand (argument) has
stronger correlation compared to the first operand. The re-
sult shows that asymmetric leakage is observable in micro-
controller.
6. Conclusion
Side-channel leakage frommultiplier is asymmetric in terms
of its two operands. The asymmetry can be reasoned and
predicted when arithmetic-circuit and micro-architecture
levels are considered. Therefore, designing operand order
can be a cost-eective countermeasure. On the other hand,
some countermeasure can be defeated if the leakages from
first and second operands are distinguishable.
There are a lot of interesting problems yet to be solved.
Notably, the attack using input-to-output collision is an in-
teresting challenge. Another important open problem is on
incomplete exponent recovery. The successful rate more
than 99% is clearly dangerous. The ideal goal is 50.0%,
however, it could possibly be relaxed.
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